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RECENT DEVELOPMENT
GREEN V. STATE: THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED TO
DISCLOSE A WITNESS'S PRETRIAL IDENTIFICATION OF
A CO-DEFENDANT; A MANDATORY DISCLOSURE EXISTS
WHEN A STATE WITNESS'S PRETRIAL IDENTIFCATION
OF A CO-DEFENDANT IS DEEMED RELEVANT MATERIAL
OR INFORMATION REGARDING THE PRETRIAL
IDENTIFCATION OF THE DEFENDANT.
By: Taylor Koncen
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that the plain language of
Maryland Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) ("Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B)") does not require
the State to disclose a witness's pretrial identification of a co-defendant.
Green v. State, 456 Md. 97, 141, 171 A.3d 1162, 1187 (2017). The court
also held that in circumstances where the witness's pretrial identification of a
co-defendant is equivalent to an identification of the defendant, disclosure by
the State is required because that identification is relevant information under
Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Id. at 161-62, 171 A.3d at 1199. Finally, the court
held that the State's failure to disclose this identification was not harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 168, 171 A.3d at 1202.
John W. Green ("Green") and Jonathan Copeland ("Copeland")
confronted Jeffrey Myers ("Myers") after Copeland's home was burglarized.
During the confrontation, Myers was fatally shot. Green, Copeland, and
Myers were the only individuals present at the scene of the shooting. Green
and Copeland were arrested and charged with first-degree murder,
conspiracy to commit first-degree murder, and other related charges.
Copeland pled guilty to first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit
first-degree murder. At trial, the State presented testimony of its sole
eyewitness, Doris Carter ("Carter"). Carter provided a description of the two
men that confronted Myers. She also identified Copeland, in the courtroom,
as the man who did not shoot Myers. Following the State's proffer of
Carter's testimony, Green objected, arguing that the State failed to disclose
Carter's identification of Copeland prior to trial. The Circuit Court for Cecil
County over-ruled Green's objection and allowed Carter to identify
Copeland as the individual who did not shoot Myers. Green was convicted
of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit first-degree murder. Green
appealed to the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland, which affirmed the
circuit court's decision, holding that the language of Md. Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) was unambiguous and did not impose an obligation upon the
State to disclose Carter's pretrial identification of Copeland.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland granted Green's petition for a writ of
certiorari to decide two issues. The first issue presented was whether the
language of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) requires the State to disclose a
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witness's pretrial identification of a co-defendant. The court was also asked
to consider the Court of Special Appeals' holding that Carter's identification
of Copeland was not relevant material or information regarding the pretrial
identification of Green. Green, 456 Md. at 121, 171 A.3d at 1175-76.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland began its analysis by examining the
language of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Green, 456 Md. at 121, 171 A.3d at
1176. The rule mandates the State to disclose all relevant material or
information regarding a witness's pretrial identification of the defendant. Id.
In the present case, the court held that the language of Md. Rule 4-
263(d)(7)(B) was plain, unambiguous, and did not require the disclosure of a
State witness's pretrial identification of a co-defendant. Id. at 147, 171 A.3d
at 1190.
Next, the court discussed whether the State was required to disclose
Carter's pretrial identification of Copeland as relevant information to the
identification of Green under the scope of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Green,
456 Md. at 147, 171 A.3d at 1190-91. Green argued that Carter's pretrial
identification of Copeland constituted relevant information since it identified
him as the shooter, and thus required disclosure. Id. at 147-48, 171 A.3d
1191. The State countered by asserting that the language of the rule only
required disclosure of relevant information regarding a pretrial identification
of Green. Id. at 148, 171 A.3d 1191.
In its analysis of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), the court reviewed precedent.
Green, 456 Md. at 148, 154, 171 A.3d at 1191, 1194. The court had
previously acknowledged that pretrial identification is not limited to photo
arrays, lineups, or other forms of State identification procedures. Id. at 152,
171 A.3d at 1193 (citing Williams v. State, 364 Md. 160, 178, 771 A.2d
1082, 1092 (2001)). Therefore, even though the identification of Green was
not the result of standard procedures, it inevitably established him as the
shooter. Green, 456 Md. at 163, 171 A.3d at 1200. The court concluded that
the identification of Copeland required disclosure, since it was relevant
information to the identification of Green. Id. at 162, 171 A.3d at 1199.
Applying this conclusion, the court held that under the circumstances of the
present case, the State violated Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B) by failing to
disclose Carter's pretrial identification of Copeland. Id. at 156, 171 A.3d at
1196.
After establishing that the State violated Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B), the
court examined whether the violation was harmless. Green, 456 Md at 165,
171 A.3d at 1201. In order to determine if the violation was harmless, the
court must assess whether the violation affected the verdict. Id. (citing Hall
v. State, 437 Md. 534, 540-41, 87 A.3d 1287, 1291 (2014)). In applying this
standard, the court held that the State's violation was not harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt because knowledge of the pretrial identification of
Copeland would have assisted Green's counsel in trial preparation. Green,
456 Md. at 166, 171 A.3d at 1202. Thus, the court reversed and remanded
the case for a new trial. Id. at 168, 171 A.3d at 1203. Judge McDonald
dissented, arguing that the majority opinion creates uncertainty in the
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application of the rule and disturbs the precise and unambiguous language of
the rule. Id. at 172, 171 A.3d at 1205.
The Court of Appeals of Maryland held that a pretrial identification of a
co-defendant that is equivalent to an identification of the defendant falls
within the scope of Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). Therefore, disclosure by the
State is required since that identification is relevant information under the
rule. The court's decision carves a narrow mandatory discovery disclosure
under Md. Rule 4-263, without disturbing the plain meaning of the rule.
This ruling demonstrates the court's goal to preserve fundamental fair trial
rights by balancing the right to put on a defense with the ability of the
prosecution to use relevant evidence in achieving justice. This case requires
the prosecution to exercise its due diligence in reviewing and establishing
whether a pretrial identification of a co-defendant must be disclosed under
Md. Rule 4-263(d)(7)(B). This duty could make it challenging for
prosecutors to understand what type of testimony constitutes an identification
requiring disclosure. Expanding this duty of due diligence could also create
an uncertainty for parties involved regarding whether the prosecution met all
mandated discovery disclosures
20181 121
